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WORKSITE RAIDS AND IMMIGRATION NORMS: 
A “STICKY” PROBLEM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Even as 2008 saw a relative lull in the heated immigration debates that 
fixated America’s democratic and academic institutions in 2006 and 2007, the 
issues continue to simmer unresolved.  Legislators continue to propose 
reforms,
1
 even as older bills
2
 stall.  Interest groups challenge government 
regulations.
3
  Political candidates square off against one another.
4
  Scholars 
and commentators analyze the laws and proposals.
5
  Yet as the debates rage, 
employers and immigrants largely ignore the laws, and the government 
continues to devise its own regulatory strategy.  Absent effective enforcement, 
the policy debate is irrelevant. 
In devising an effective immigration regulation strategy, it is critical to 
distinguish the ends from the means.  Adam Cox and Eric Posner identify two 
distinct issues that shape immigration regulation.
6
  The first are policy 
decisions, so-called ―first-order‖ issues.7  Here, the government makes 
decisions regarding the quantity and type of admissible immigrants as well as 
the terms of their admission.
8
  Next are the institutional design questions, or 
―second-order‖ issues.9  Here, the government makes decisions regarding the 
institutional and regulatory system that counts, sorts, and screens 
 
1. See, e.g., Protect Citizens and Residents from Unlawful Raids and Detention Act, S. 3594, 
110th Cong. (2008). 
2. See, e.g., Secure Borders FIRST (For Integrity, Reform, Safety, and Anti-Terrorism) Act of 
2007, H.R. 2954, 110th Cong.; Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2007, S. 1639, 110th 
Cong.; Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong.; Border Protection, 
Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong.; Secure America 
and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005). 
3. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Revised Rule for Employers that Hire Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
25, 2007, at A34. 
4. See, e.g., Michael Cooper & Marc Santora, Candidates Firm on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 10, 2007, at A1; NPR Democratic Candidates Debate (National Public Radio broadcast Dec. 4, 
2007), transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16898435. 
5. See generally, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of 
Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2007); Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of 
Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193. 
6. Cox & Posner, supra note 5, at 814–22. 
7. Id. at 814. 
8. Id. at 814–17. 
9. Id. at 819–20. 
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immigrants.
10
  Too often, however, the government fails to distinguish 
between first- and second-order issues; that is, the ends become blurred with 
the means. 
The consequences of this perceptive failure are cyclical.  First, second-
order design flaws go unnoticed, or at least, under-analyzed.  Instead, the 
government equates a lack of results with lax enforcement.  The government 
inevitably ―solves‖ this problem with more aggressive or intrusive 
enforcement of the flawed second-order systems.  The resulting ―solutions‖ 
do not remedy the real second-order design flaw but instead perpetuate or 
even aggravate the existing one. 
Indeed, such a perceptive failure is likely occurring today with the 
government’s employer sanctioning laws.  Widespread failures are attributed 
to fraud and remedied with aggressive enforcement practices.
11
  If these 
failures persist, immigration reform is effectively impossible.  That is, first-
order decisions (e.g., guest-worker programs, paths to citizenship, etc.) will 
give way to the de facto illegal immigrant system that exists today.
12
 
This Comment suggests that one of the unnoticed design flaws of the 
current employer regulation regime is that it runs counter to social norms.  For 
years, the government has considered fraudulent documents to be the greatest 
cause of unauthorized employment in America,
13
 but perhaps it is not.  
Because of fraudulent documents,
14
 many employers cannot follow the law 
even if they want to because they cannot tell legal workers from illegal ones.  
Perhaps the more significant reason is that many employers have adopted pro-
illegal immigrant norms.  Such norms would undermine the enforcement of 
immigration laws in several ways.  Critically, they could fuel a backlash 
against an aggressive antifraud campaign, which is exactly the direction in 
which current policy is headed. 
This Comment will focus exclusively on second-order immigration issues 
and will not address first-order immigration policies.  Part II of this Comment 
will describe the current employer sanctioning laws and their origins.  Part III 
will describe employer sanctioning in practice as well as legislative proposals 
for reform.  Part IV will outline a social-science model of social norms and 
will examine immigration norms through that model. 
 
10. Id. 
11. See infra Part III.B. 
12. Cox & Posner, supra note 5, at 844–45. 
13. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: WEAKNESSES HINDER 
EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION AND WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 5 (2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05813.pdf [hereinafter IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT]. 
14. Id. 
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II. EMPLOYER SANCTIONING LAWS 
In the early 1980s, when Americans perceived Mexican migration to have 
reached crisis levels, public pressure for employer sanctions mounted.
15
  In 
fact, by 1981, a majority of Americans favored the idea of employer sanctions 
to control immigration.
16
  It seemed obvious that prohibiting the unauthorized 
employment of immigrants would curb the flow of economic migration.
17
  
Reducing immigrants’ access to jobs and income would reduce the flow of 
aliens into the United States and simultaneously prompt the voluntary 
departure of many already present.
18
 
Enforcing an employment prohibition appears simple and logical.  
Legislators intuitively rely on general deterrence and criminalization models 
to establish an enforcement regime.
19
  For one, such a regime ―appear[s] 
costless.‖20  The infrastructure is already in place and thus requires no 
additional resources.
21
  The new laws simply become new tools for judges, 
prosecutors, and investigators.  Furthermore, the deterrence model fits with 
certain philosophical
22
 and economic ideas of human behavior.
23
  And if the 
initial scheme is not successful, lawmakers can even increase penalties with 
very little cost.
24
  Indeed, by 1982, many Western nations
25
 and at least ten 
states had already implemented employer sanction regimes.
26
 
 
15. NICHOLAS LAHAM, RONALD REAGAN AND THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 94 
(2000) (citing a 1981 poll revealing an ―overwhelming majority‖ in favor of employer sanctions). 
16. Id. 
17. See Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Policy: Thinking Outside the (Big) Box, 39 CONN. L. REV. 
1401, 1426 (2007) (calling the sanctioning of U.S. employers ―the most obvious method[]‖ of 
reducing illegal immigration). 
18. See, e.g., Stephanie E. Tanger, Enforcing Corporate Responsibility for Violations of 
Workplace Immigration Laws: The Case of Meatpacking, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 59, 60 (2006); 
Steven A. Camarota, Use Enforcement to Ease Situation, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 23, 2005, available 
at http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/camerataoped1005.html (predicting that with increased 
enforcement immigrants would ―self-deport‖). 
19. See Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. 
L. REV. 655, 668–69 (2006) (explaining legislatures’ propensity for ―fiat‖). 
20. See id. at 668. 
21. Id.  In the case of immigration enforcement, Congress would rely upon the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) as well as the Department of Labor (DOL).  See infra note 39. 
22. Cheng, supra note 19, at 668. 
23. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169 (1968) (discussing ―how many resources and how much punishment should be used to 
enforce different kinds of legislation‖). 
24. See id. at 183–84. 
25. Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and 
Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 679 (1997) (citing GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
INFORMATION ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS REGARDING EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS IN SELECTED 
COUNTRIES (1982)).  The notable exception to this trend was Great Britain.  Id. at 679. 
26. Carl E. Schwarz, Employer Sanctions Laws, Worker Identification Systems, and 
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Following suit in 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA), creating a number of criminal and civil sanctions for 
employers who hired illegal immigrants.
27
  The law reflected a compromise 
between labor and business interests.
28
  For labor groups seeking to reduce the 
number of foreigners in the workforce, it became illegal for an employer to 
hire or employ an ―unauthorized alien.‖29  But for employers, nervous about 
civil and criminal liability, good faith was a complete defense.
30
 
The resulting compromise required employers to verify and attest to the 
legal status of each of their employees on a standard I-9 form.
31
  Under this 
system, an employer’s duties appear fairly simple.32  First, within three days 
of hiring any new employee, the employer must ―physically examine‖ the 
employee’s identification documents.33  During this inspection, the employer 
must determine whether the documents ―appear to be genuine and to relate to 
the [employee].‖34  If satisfied, the employer must attest to compliance under 
the penalty of perjury.
35
  At its core, the employer’s duty is not unlike a bar 
owner’s duty to verify the age of prospective consumers of alcohol. 
An employer who fails to comply with the above procedures would face a 
wide range of civil and criminal punishments.  For example, an employer who 
simply fails to comply with the I-9 documentation requirements could be 
fined as little as $110.
36
  In contrast, an employer who engages in ―a pattern or 
practice‖ of hiring illegal immigrants could face six months in prison.37  
Today, an employer typically faces a $2200 fine for a first offense.
38
  Any 
 
Undocumented Aliens: The State Experience and Federal Proposals, 19 STAN. J. INT’L L. 371, 373 
(1983). 
27. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see Medina, 
supra note 25, at 671. 
28. See NANCY HUMEL MONTWIELER, THE IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW OF 1986: ANALYSIS, 
TEXT, AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 10 (1987). 
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
30. Id. § 1324a(b)(6); see Developments in the Law—Jobs and Borders, Legal Protections for 
Illegal Workers, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2224, 2240 (2005) (―Completion of the I-9 generally insulates 
the employer from liability . . . .‖); see also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.4 (2008) (―An employer . . . who shows 
good faith compliance with the employment verification requirements . . . shall have established a 
rebuttable affirmative defense that the person or entity has not violated section 274A(a)(1)(A) of the 
Act with respect to such hiring, recruiting, or referral.‖). 
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A). 
32. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a. 
33. Id. § 274a.2(b)(1)(ii)(A).  For a complete list of acceptable identification documents, see id. 
§ 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(A)(1)–(5). 
34. Id. § 274a.2(b)(1)(ii)(A). 
35. Id. § 274a.2(a)(3). 
36. Id. § 274a.10(b)(2). 
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1) (2006). 
38. Julia Preston, Farmers Call Crackdown on Illegal Workers Unfair, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 
2007, at A10. 
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individual who knows of a violation, or potential violation, of the above laws 
may file a written complaint with Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE).
39
  The agency may then conduct an investigation and issue either a 
―Notice of Intent to Fine‖ or a ―Warning Notice.‖40  At this point, an 
employer may request a hearing before an administrative law judge regarding 
the violation.
41
 
In practice, these sanctions have placed employers in an awkward 
position.
42
  As one commentator stated, businesses were ―deputize[d]‖ in the 
―fight against illegal immigration.‖43  But rather than train and fund these new 
―deputies,‖ authorities increasingly tend to coerce them.44 
III. EMPLOYER REGULATION IN PRACTICE 
Although the statutory framework underlying worksite enforcement has 
remained largely unchanged for the past two decades, the priorities and 
strategies of the enforcement agencies have varied tremendously.  Until 2001, 
both government and business simply ignored the laws.
45
  After the terrorist 
attacks of 2001, the government used the laws to regulate ―critical 
infrastructure‖ jobs like airport security.46  Then, after legislative immigration 
reform efforts failed very publicly in 2005 and 2006, the government began 
relying heavily on deterrence through highly publicized worksite raids and 
employer sanctions. 
In addition to coercing compliance from reluctant ―deputies,‖ the 
government also developed several methods of assisting more cooperative 
employers.  Specifically, the government knew that fraudulent documents and 
identity theft had severely undermined employers’ ability to comply with the 
 
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(a).  Initially, the enforcement of employment 
regulation fell upon the INS, within the U.S. Department of Justice. See IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, at 1 n.2.  In 2003, however, Congress shifted these responsibilities to 
ICE, within the new Department of Homeland Security.  Id. 
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(1)–(2); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(b)–(d). 
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.9(e). 
42. See Thomas C. Green & Ileana Ciobanu, Deputizing—And Then Prosecuting—America’s 
Businesses in the Fight Against Illegal Immigration, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1203, 1204–05 (2006); 
Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration Enforcement , 2006 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 887, 889–90. 
43. Green & Ciobanu, supra note 42, at 1204. 
44. See infra Part III. 
45. See Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of White-
Collar Crime, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1050–51 (1990) (describing the early years of 
enforcement). 
46. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, at 30–31. 
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laws.
47
  It sought to develop strategies of technology and intergovernmental 
collaboration to assist employers with widespread document fraud.
48
 
A. General Neglect During the Early Years 
From 1986 to 2005, employer sanctions were a relatively low priority, 
even among the agencies charged with immigration regulation.
49
  For 
example, between 1994 and 1998 the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) devoted less than two percent of its resources to enforcing worksite 
compliance.
50
  In real terms, a U.S. General Accounting Office audit 
estimated that the INS committed the equivalent of 300 full-time employees 
to employer monitoring in 1998.
51
  As a point of reference, there were an 
estimated 200,000 employers employing millions of unauthorized workers at 
the time.
52
  The number actually declined for the next five years until 2003, 
when only ninety employees were committed to such responsibilities.
53
  And 
indeed, following September 11, 2001, the INS’s efforts were directed mainly 
at ―critical infrastructure‖ jobs (e.g., airport security, nuclear energy, etc.).54 
By 2003 and 2004, federal regulators were barely fining employers.  ICE 
issued only three notices of intent to fine in 2004
55
 and prosecuted only four 
employers in 2003.
56
  ICE collected a mere $6500 in fines in 2005.
57
  In 
comparison, in 2004, the Department of Labor (DOL) assessed more than $4 
million in fines against employers convicted of violating child labor laws.
58
  
By any standard, the enforcement of immigration laws against employers was 
a low priority. 
 
47. See, e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS: SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES TO 
REDUCING UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN EMPLOYMENT EXIST 9 (1999), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99033.pdf [hereinafter ILLEGAL ALIENS]. 
48. Id. at 11, 18. 
49. Id. at 15–18. 
50. Id. at 16.  In contrast, the INS was spending seventy percent of its resources on border 
inspections and patrols.  Id. at 17 fig.1. 
51. Id. at 16.  This number is an estimation based on the concept of ―workyears,‖ by which the 
INS maintained internal records.  Id. 
52. Id. at 17. 
53. IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, at 32. 
54. Id. at 32 n.53. 
55. Id. at 35 fig.4; Spencer S. Hsu & Kari Lydersen, Illegal Hiring Is Rarely Penalized, WASH. 
POST, June 19, 2006, at A1. 
56. Hsu & Lydersen, supra note 55. 
57. Press Release, ICE, ICE Arrests 28 Workers at Area Nursery, Landscaping Business (Apr. 
25, 2008), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/080425elpaso.htm. 
58. DOL, WAGE & HOUR DIV., 2004 STATISTICS FACT SHEET, available at 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/statistics/200411.htm. 
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These minimal efforts had little effect, and employers largely ignored the 
law.
59
  By March 2005, illegal immigrants constituted approximately five 
percent of the total U.S. labor force.
60
  That proportion was greater still in the 
low-wage, low-skill labor markets.
61
  For example, nearly a quarter of the 
nation’s agricultural workers were unauthorized.62  Similarly, illegal 
immigrants made up more than ten percent of the nation’s cleaning, 
construction, and food service workers.
63
 
In light of the government’s failure to stem the flow of immigrants, some 
commentators called for the abandonment of employer sanctions as a means 
of immigration regulation.
64
  Far from giving up, however, the government 
responded to its failures by redoubling its efforts. 
B. High-Profile Crackdowns 
Beginning in 2006, the government implemented a series of high-profile 
crackdowns on companies that employed illegal aliens.
65
  It relied more 
heavily on criminal prosecutions and the seizure of company assets, rather 
than civil fines.
66
  Many of the targets were big businesses that employ many 
illegal aliens.
67
  After years of investigations, officers would raid a business 
and sometimes arrest employers and supervisors.
68
  The government followed 
the raids with massive criminal prosecutions of the immigrant employees for 
identity theft.
69
  Tellingly, in 2007, approximately one-tenth of ICE’s worksite 
enforcement criminal arrests were of supervisors.
70
 
 
59. See Calavita, supra note 45, at 1050–51.  For example, in a survey of immigrant-dependent 
employers taken in the immediate aftermath of the IRCA, eight percent of employers said that the 
law did not affect their hiring practices ―in any way.‖  Id. 
60. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISP. CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. 9 (2006), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf. 
61. Id. at 11. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. See, e.g., Hing, supra note 17, at 1401; Wishnie, supra note 5, at 193. 
65. See, e.g., Press Release, ICE, Factsheet: Worksite Enforcement (Nov. 25, 2008), available 
at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/worksite.htm [hereinafter Worksite Factsheet] 
(documenting a dramatic increase in administrative and criminal arrests through worksite raids in 
2006 and 2007); Steven Greenhouse, Immigrant Crackdown Upends A Slaughterhouse’s Work 
Force, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007, at A1 (reporting a raid on the world’s largest hog butchering plant 
and another on a poultry plant that netted more than 100 workers). 
66. Worksite Factsheet, supra note 65. 
67. See Greenhouse, supra note 65. 
68. Worksite Factsheet, supra note 65. 
69. Julia Preston, 270 Immigrants Sent to Prison in Federal Push, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2008, 
at A1. 
70. Worksite Factsheet, supra note 65.  According to the fact sheet, of the 2007 criminal 
arrests, ―more than 90 individuals [were] in company supervisory chains.‖  Id.  There were 863 total 
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High-profile raids on big businesses are attractive to ICE as an efficient 
deterrence strategy.  This is in part because when ICE raids a large employer, 
agents may detain hundreds of illegal immigrants.  The numbers help capture 
headlines, which in turn serve as a warning to other employers.  Then, even if 
the employer is never prosecuted, the raid should nevertheless have a 
deterrent effect on employers and employees.  Because investigations of 
employers may be costly and time-consuming,
71
 raids on large employers 
appear to be efficient. 
The government took the first step in 2005 when ICE began to dedicate 
greater resources to worksite enforcement.
72
  Although it is difficult to 
determine how many more resources ICE has committed to worksite 
enforcement, a 2007 Government Accountability Office audit suggests a 
significant increase.
73
  Specifically, government auditors found that between 
2003 and 2007 there had been a ―six-fold increase in the number of new 
officers dedicated to worksite enforcement operations.‖74 
As a result of the strategy shift and increased resources, employers have 
faced increasing criminal sanctions.
75
  In 2007, for example, a California 
fence building company forfeited nearly $5 million, and a federal judge 
sentenced its president and vice president to serve six months’ house arrest 
and to pay six-figure fines.
76
  ―Meaningful employer sanctions . . . are an 
important component of criminal enforcement of illegal immigration across 
our border with Mexico,‖ said United States Attorney Karen P. Hewitt.77  
Further evidence of the increased sanctions can be found in the recent large 
 
criminal arrests that year.  Id. 
71. The raid of one Iowa meatpacker cost ICE an estimated $5.2 million.  William Petroski, 
Taxpayers’ Costs Top $5 Million For Raid at Postville, DES MOINES REGISTER, Oct. 14, 2008, at 
1A. 
72. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: ICE COULD 
IMPROVE CONTROLS TO HELP GUIDE ALIEN REMOVAL DECISION MAKING 23–24 & fig.2 (2007), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0867.pdf. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 23.  However, because 2003 was a low point in worksite enforcement operations, 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, at 33 fig.3, this number reflects a bit of bureaucratic 
back-patting. 
75. The total dollar amount of criminal sanctions in 2007 was over $30 million.  Worksite 
Factsheet, supra note 65; see also Preston, supra note 38 (quoting DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff 
as claiming a record number of felony criminal charges against employers in 2006 and 2007). 
76. See, e.g., Press Release, ICE, Company Executives Sentenced for Hiring Illegal Alien 
Workers (Mar. 28, 2007), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/070328sandiego.htm; $5 Million Fine for Hiring 
Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, at A38. 
77. ICE, supra note 76. 
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settlements.  For example, ICE agreed to an $11 million settlement with Wal-
Mart for employing illegal aliens in twenty-one states.
78
 
The raids of two large meatpacking plants exemplify ICE’s deterrence-
based raid strategy. The largest of such raids occurred on December 12, 2006, 
when ICE raided plants owned by Swift and Co., a meatpacking business.
79
  
The raids resulted in more worksite arrests than ICE had made in all of fiscal 
year 2005 and more than a third of all administrative arrests made in 2006.
80
 
A similar raid took place in 2008 at the nation’s largest kosher 
meatpacking plant.
81
  Beginning in early 2006, ICE learned of widespread 
immigration and labor violations at the Postville, Iowa, plant from a number 
of former employees and managers.
82
  A former manager told ICE that as 
many as eighty percent of the company’s workers were not authorized to work 
in the United States.
83
  On May 12, 2008, ICE raided the facilities and 
detained nearly 400 employees.
84
 
The consequences of this particular raid have been tremendous.  For the 
immigrants, several hundred were sent to federal prison on identity theft 
charges.
85
  For the owners, the state of Iowa charged company owners and 
executives with more than 9000 criminal counts of child labor violations,
86
 
and federal authorities charged them with criminal immigration violations.
87
  
Tellingly, federal authorities did not charge the owners with knowingly 
employing illegal immigrants.
88
  Shortly after the raid, the business filed for 
bankruptcy.
89
 
 
78. Press Release, ICE, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Agrees to Pay a Record $11 Million to ICE to 
Settle Nationwide Worksite Enforcement Investigation (Mar. 18, 2005) (on file with the Marquette 
Law Review). 
79. Press Release, ICE, U.S. Uncovers Large-Scale Identity Theft Scheme Used By Illegal 
Aliens to Gain Employment at Nationwide Meat Processor (Dec. 13, 2006), available at 
http://www.visaserve.com/CM/Articles/CIS%20Press%20Release%20on%20Identity%20Theft.pdf. 
80. Compare id. (reporting 1282 administrative detentions in the Swift raids) with Worksite 
Factsheet, supra note 65 (reporting 1116 total administrative arrests in 2005 and 3667 in 2006). 
81. Preston, supra note 69. 
82. Affidavit of David M. Hoagland at 2, 7 (May 9, 2008), available at 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/assets/pdf/ice_application.pdf (suggesting that Source #1 
contacted ICE in January 2006, nearly two-and-a-half years before the raid). 
83. Id. at 7. 
84. Preston, supra note 69. 
85. Id. 
86. Complaint, Iowa v. Agriprocessors, Inc., No. SMCR009340-9345 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Sept. 9, 
2008), available at 
http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/releases/sept_2008/Agriprocessors_COMPLAINT
.pdf. 
87. Complaint, United States v. Agriprocessors, Inc., No. CR08-1324 LRR (N.D. Iowa Nov. 
20, 2008), available at http://www.desmoinesregister.com/assets/pdf/AgriprocessorsIndictment.pdf. 
88. Id. 
89. Julia Preston, Large Iowa Meatpacker in Illegal Immigrant Raid Files For Bankruptcy, 
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C. Other Strategies: Fraud, Technology, and Collaboration 
In addition to deterrence, the government has tried a number of other 
strategies to reduce the number of illegal immigrants in the workforce.  First, 
citing widespread fraud, it has ratcheted up document requirements and 
increased the use of technology.
90
  Additionally, to achieve the above 
objective, the government has tried to divide immigration regulation among a 
variety of government agencies. 
Many of the government’s recent immigration laws combined technology 
and fiat to combat perceived fraud.  Decades of government audits, studies, 
and commissions concluded that the ―widespread use of fraudulent 
documents‖ was the greatest factor undermining employer-based immigration 
regulation.
91
  The first step of the government’s war on fraud was to reduce 
the number of acceptable forms of identification.  The INS began that process 
in 1993 by proposing a rule that would have eliminated certain forms of 
identification from the list of acceptable I-9 verification documents.
92
  In 
1996, Congress stepped in and prohibited the use of other documents, 
including birth certificates, as proof of worker eligibility.
93
  Then, in each of 
the following three years, the INS proposed increasing document 
restrictions.
94
  In a similar vein, Congress passed the REAL ID Act of 2005, 
requiring that all states verify the immigration status of its residents before 
issuing them state identification or driver’s licenses.95 
The second prong of the government’s assault on fraud is technology.  As 
one example, the INS began to use technological advancements to prevent 
fraud of its own identification documents.
96
  Similarly, Congress required that 
the Social Security Administration (SSA) develop counterfeit-proof 
documents in 1996.
97
  Most significantly, however, the government has 
 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A21. 
90. ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 47, at 9–12; IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, 
at 5. 
91. ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 47, at 3, 9. 
92. Id. at 13–14. 
93. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 412, 110 Stat. 3009-666 (1996) [hereinafter IIRIRA]. 
94. ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 47, at 14. 
95. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2000)).  One of the many 
collateral costs of this strategy, however, is less driver education and car insurance for illegal 
immigrant motorists.  David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. 
REV. 1359, 1382 (2007).  It is difficult to determine the lawmakers’ purpose behind the REAL ID 
Act because it was wedged into an emergency appropriations bill that funded both the Iraq War and 
Tsunami relief.  See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on 
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). 
96. ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 47, at 15 (describing how the INS began using holograms on 
its identification documents in 1997). 
97. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 401, 110 Stat. 3009-655 (1996).  Although in the end, the SSA did 
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pinned its aspirations of immigration regulation to electronic employee 
verification systems.
98
  At the urging of Congress, the Attorney General first 
introduced such a system in 1997.
99
  Known originally as ―Basic Pilot,‖100 it is 
a voluntary tool by which employers can check an employee’s reported Social 
Security number against an SSA database.
101
  Since its inception, it has been 
met with qualified praise from government officials,
102
 but with hesitation 
from employers.
103
 
Finally, the government has tried to split up the employer enforcement 
duties among multiple government agencies.
104
  But relying on other agencies 
has proven difficult because immigration enforcement often conflicts with the 
primary goals of the other agency.
105
  Specifically, the DOL resisted 
collaboration with the INS because it relied heavily on employee 
complaints.
106
  Any involvement with INS, it was feared, would reduce 
employees’ willingness to cooperate with the DOL.107 
Collaboration with the SSA has also proven difficult.  Every year, the 
employers of illegal aliens generate millions of W-2 forms that do not match 
SSA records.
108
  In response, the SSA sends hundreds of thousands of ―no 
match letters‖ to employers.109  In August 2007, the Department of Homeland 
 
not put the cards into use. 
98. See IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, at 42–44. 
99. IIRIRA required the Attorney General to create a voluntary program for employers.  Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, § 401, 110 Stat. 3009-655 (1996). 
100. The name has since been changed to ―e-Verify.‖  Press Release, U.S. Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs., Fact Sheet: E-Verify (Sept. 25, 2007), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/EVerifyFS25Sep07.pdf. 
101. Id.; see also Stephen A. Brown, Comment, Illegal Immigrants In The Workplace: Why 
Electronic Verification Benefits Employers, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 349, 381–83 (2007) (detailing the 
history of the project). 
102. See, e.g., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, at 20 (The Government 
Accountability Office concluded that it ―shows promise.‖); Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: 
Basic Pilot: A Clear and Reliable Way to Verify Employment Eligibility (July 5, 2006), available at 
http://www.jbsswift.com/media/releases/White_House_Basic_Pilot_Fact_Sheet.pdf (―It’s 
working.‖). 
103. By 2004, only 2300 employers had signed up for the system.  IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 13, at 20–21.  By 2007, that number had reportedly grown to 23,000.  
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., supra note 100.  In fact, when INS originally failed to meet 
its target participation numbers, it credited employer reluctance.  ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 47, at 
12. 
104. See Tanger, supra note 18, at 66. 
105. Id. at 71. 
106. ILLEGAL ALIENS, supra note 47, at 16, 19. 
107. Id. 
108. Roger Tsai, The Immigration Crackdown on Employers, BUS. L. TODAY 45, 47 (July–
Aug., 2007).  But because typographical errors or name changes may prompt a no-match letter, the 
letter does not prove that a worker is unauthorized. 
109. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., WHAT THE ORDER GRANTING A PRELIMINARY 
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Security (DHS) issued a rule stating that all letters were constructive 
knowledge of an employee’s unauthorized status, unless the employer 
followed its safe-harbor provisions.
110
  But DHS withdrew the rule by the end 
of the year, after labor and civil liberties groups challenged the law in court.
111
  
Thus, it is not clear how SSA’s resources may be used to regulate employers. 
D. Proposed Legislative Changes 
Although immigration enforcement is controlled by executive agencies 
like ICE, legislators have proposed a variety of laws that would affect the 
agencies’ tactics.112  Four bills proposed in 2007 and 2008 contained as wide a 
variety of first-order policy goals
113
 as second-order regulatory schemes.
114
  
Two were immigration reform bills of 2007, one from the House and one 
from the Senate.  Both bills focused on fraud prevention through document 
restrictions and increased technology,
115
 and the House bill supplemented this 
effort with heightened punishments for knowing violations of the law.
116
  Next 
was a narrower 2008 bill, codifying aliens’ rights during detention and 
limiting the government’s enforcement tactics.117  The final one was a DHS 
appropriations bill, in which legislators sought to direct a large portion of 
 
INJUNCTION MEANS FOR THE DHS RULE ABOUT SOCIAL SECURITY ―NO-MATCH‖ (2007) (stating 
that the SSA planned to send 140,000 letters); David P. McCauley, Employing Foreign Workers in 
the U.S. Construction Industry: Possibilities, Pitfalls, and Lessons Learned , 27 CONSTRUCTION 
LAW. 17, 21 (2007) (reporting that 900,000 letters were sent because of 6 million to 7 million 
unmatched W-2s in 2002); Tsai, supra note 108, at 47 (reporting that 126,250 letters were sent out of 
7.5 million unmatched W-2s in 2003). 
110. 72 Fed. Reg. 45,611, 45,612–13 (Aug. 15, 2007) (amending 8 CFR § 274a.1(l)(1) (2007)).  
The safe-harbor provisions give an employer thirty days to resolve any discrepancy with its 
employee, by reviewing documents to check for errors and confirming the correction with the SSA or 
DHS.  Id. 
111. Mary Lou Pickel, Firms Get Reprieve; ID Plan on Hold, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Dec. 25, 2007, at 1A; Preston, supra note 3. 
112. See, e.g., Protect Citizens and Residents from Unlawful Raids and Detention Act, S. 3594, 
110th Cong. (2008); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009, H.R. 6947, 110th 
Cong. (2008); Secure Borders FIRST (For Integrity, Reform, Safety, and Anti-Terrorism) Act, H.R. 
2954, 110th Cong. (2007); Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2007, S. 1639, 110th 
Cong. tit. VIII, subtit. A. 
113. For example, the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act provided for interpreters to 
help screen for asylum claimants.  S. 1639, § 142(d).  In contrast, the Secure Borders FIRST Act 
would, for example, deny entry to all foreign nationals of countries that refuse to accept their own 
deported nationals, H.R. 2954, § 108, and would declare English the official language, id. § 503. 
114. See, e.g., S. 3594, § 4(f)(1)(A) (forbidding immigration authorities from conducting raids 
near churches or schools); H.R. 2954, § 305 (increasing punishments for employers who knowingly 
hire illegal immigrants). 
115. See H.R. 2954, § 303; S. 1639, § 302(a). 
116. H.R. 2954, § 305. 
117. S. 3594, § 4. 
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ICE’s funding away from immigration raids.118  None of the above laws were 
enacted before the end of the 2007–2008 session of Congress. 
The Senate’s 2007 immigration reformation bill would have modified 
employer regulation in four main ways.
119
  First, the law would have 
mandated participation in an electronic worker eligibility program.
120
  Second, 
it would have made illegal the ―reckless‖ employment of unauthorized 
aliens.
121
  Reducing the minimum culpability for a conviction would have 
reduced the costs of investigating and prosecuting employers.
122
  Third, the 
bill would have further tightened the documentation requirements facing 
employers.
123
  Specifically, the law would have required employers to demand 
a state issued driver’s license or identification card.124  Finally, the bill would 
have created a voluntary program by which employers could verify their 
employees’ employment eligibility by submitting employee fingerprints to 
DHS.
125
 
The House’s immigration reform bill was conceptually similar in its focus 
on fraud but was accompanied by increased fines for employers.
126
  First, the 
bill would have created a national ―Employment Eligibility Database‖ under 
the management of DHS.
127
  The database would have contained more 
information than e-Verify but would have built on its framework to the extent 
possible.
128
  Second, the bill would have required the SSA to create new 
Social Security cards.
129
  The cards would have had to include a photograph 
and an encrypted, machine-readable strip for added security.
130
  Employers 
would be forbidden from hiring without requiring this card and verifying it 
 
118. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act 2009, H.R. 6947, 110th Cong. 
(2008). 
119. S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 302 (2007) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)). 
120. Id. § 302(a). 
121. Id. (although knowledge would still be required to incur criminal sanctions). 
122. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5–17 (1987). 
123. Compare S. 1639, § 302(a) with 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(B)–(D) (2006) (S. 1639, § 302(a) 
allows employers to rely on identity documents only if they contain higher levels of anti-fraud 
protections than currently required in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1).). 
124. S. 1639, § 302(a).  Here the bill included a redundant verification process because the only 
acceptable state IDs were ones that were issued in compliance with the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 302 (codified in 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2000)). 
125. S. 1639, § 307. 
126. Secure Borders FIRST Act of 2007, H.R. 2954, 110th Cong. § 305. 
127. Id. § 303(a). 
128. Id. § 303(a)–(b). 
129. Id. § 302(a). 
130. Id. § 302(a)(ii).  Although the bill later suggests that employers would have access to card 
readers, it is not clear how or when this would happen—only that the readers should be provided at 
―minimal cost to [employers].‖  Id. § 304(a). 
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against the DHS database.
131
  Finally, the bill would have dramatically 
increased the penalties for employer violations.
132
  Most of the minimum 
authorized fines would have been increased ten to twenty times,
133
 and the bill 
also required a minimum one-year imprisonment for repeat offenders.
134
 
In September 2008, Senator Robert Menendez of New Jersey introduced a 
bill limiting enforcement tactics during immigration enforcement actions.
135
  
For one, the bill would have required DHS (and therefore ICE) to avoid 
apprehending individuals near churches, schools, courts, hospitals, and similar 
―community institutions.‖136  Before large-scale raids, ICE would have been 
required to notify state and local child-welfare services.
137
  After raids, the bill 
would have required the government to screen out and parole members of 
―vulnerable population groups‖ like primary caregivers and victims of human 
trafficking.
138
  To ensure administrative compliance, the bill would have 
installed an ombudsman within DHS.
139
 
The House version of the 2009 DHS appropriations bill reflects a more 
indirect effect.  Specifically, the bill would direct a large portion of ICE’s 
funding toward the arrest of criminal aliens.
140
  Although this is not a direct 
indictment of worksite raids, it necessarily de-prioritizes them as an ICE 
strategy.  In fact, the House Appropriations Committee recommended a slight 
decrease in funding for worksite enforcement.
141
 
IV. SOCIAL NORMS AND EMPLOYER REGULATION 
To evaluate any of the above proposals, one must determine why the 
government has been so unsuccessful at keeping immigrants from getting 
jobs.  Widespread document fraud is undoubtedly one such reason.  Forged 
documents effectively shift the risk of prosecution from employers to 
employees because employers face punishment only for ―knowing‖ 
 
131. Id. § 304(a). 
132. Id. § 305. 
133. Id.  Indeed, a paperwork violation would carry a minimum $1000 fine.  Id. 
134. Id. § 305(4). 
135. Protect Citizens and Residents from Unlawful Raids and Detention Act, S. 3594, 110th 
Cong. (2008). 
136. Id. § 4(f). 
137. Id. § 5(3). 
138. Id. § 7. 
139. Id. § 10. 
140. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009, H.R. 6947, 110th Cong. 
(2008). 
141. See H.R. REP. No 110-862, at 51–52 (2008).  The House Appropriations Committee 
recommended that ICE allocate $90 million toward worksite enforcement.  Id.  This would be a 
slight decrease in funding from the $92 million budgeted for 2008.  Id.  For some context, the 
Postville, Iowa, raid, discussed above, cost more than $5 million.  Petroski, supra note 71. 
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violations.
142
  And given the high quantity of labor demanded at the federal 
minimum wage, immigration seems almost inevitable.
143
  In fact, one 
commentator has argued that ―market forces are simply too strong to be 
overcome by standard responses of strengthening border enforcement or 
renewing employer sanction efforts.‖144 
Lost in the discussion of fraud and wages, however, is any discussion of 
social norms.  The fact is, many employers deliberately violate federal laws.  
Even if new fraud prevention technology worked perfectly, such technology 
may have little impact on employers who feel economically compelled and 
morally justified when hiring illegal immigrants.  To those employers, the 
twin strategies of deterrence and fraud prevention may not be effective.  
Although the data are not sufficient to determine the number of such 
employers, one can be reasonably certain of their existence. 
A. The Model 
An increasing body of literature
145
 explains legal compliance as a product 
of social norms.
146
  Indeed, social norms often influence behavior more than 
―instrumental‖ influences (e.g., risk of legal sanction).147  Thus, the decisions 
to comply with the law rarely reflect a rational calculation of risk versus 
reward.
148
  Instead, the decisions reflect internalized notions of morality or 
 
142. Employees who use false documents to get a job often are prosecuted under felony 
identity theft laws intended to deter theft.  John Leland, Some ID Theft Is Not for Profit, But to Get a 
Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006, at A1.  But DHS Secretary Chertoff sees the relationship between 
immigration laws and identity theft laws differently: ―[E]ntering the country illegally can serve as a 
gateway to other crimes including identity theft and document fraud.‖   Press Release, ICE, ICE 
Makes Additional Criminal Arrests at Swift & Company Plants (July 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/070711washingtondc.htm. 
143. See M. Isabel Medina, Wal-Mart, Immigrant Workers and the U.S. Government—A Case 
of Split Personality, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1443, 1459 (2007). 
144. Hing, supra note 17, at 1401. 
145. See generally, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Ben Depoorter 
& Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 
1127 (2005); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 338 (1997); Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 
391 (2000); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1781 (2000). 
146. Richard McAdams defines social norms as ―informal social regularities that individuals 
feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-
legal sanctions, or both.‖  McAdams, supra note 145, at 340. 
147. See Depoorter & Vanneste, supra note 145, at 1139; Meares, supra note 145, at 392. 
148. Indeed, risk perception and calculation are distorted by so many cultural and normative 
factors that it is questionable whether hiring decisions would appropriately respond to regulation.  
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741 
(2008). 
606 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [92:591 
legitimacy.
149
  For example, people pay their taxes even though the risk of an 
audit multiplied by the costs of potential penalties is significantly less than the 
cost of paying.
150
  They do so in part because of social norms.
151
 
Although norms can be influenced by a variety of factors, including the 
law, they are very difficult to engineer.
152
  On one hand, ―individuals prefer to 
carry out their legal obligations.‖153  Thus, when lawmakers call something 
(or someone) illegal, it has an effect on an individual’s internalized ―moral 
appraisal‖ of related behaviors.154  However, the normative force of a law may 
be overcome by both internal and external influences.  Internally, norms may 
be influenced by an individual’s desire to avoid cognitive dissonance.155  That 
is, individuals sometimes adjust their beliefs to conform with their behavior, 
thus reducing the uncomfortable cognitive dissonance between belief and 
behavior.
156
  Externally, norms are shaped by the perceived actions and beliefs 
of an individual’s peers.157  Therefore, the public enforcement of a law may 
even be counterproductive if it demonstrates widespread violation by one’s 
peers.
158
 
All of the above influences can be found in the case of Internet piracy.
159
  
A 2005 study revealed two reasons why heavy-handed copyright enforcement 
against file-sharers is counterproductive.
160
  First, the public enforcement of 
copyrights raised awareness among inexperienced downloaders of what their 
peers were doing.
161
  Second, harsh copyright enforcement prompted a 
backlash from experienced downloaders, whose anti-copyright norms were 
 
149. See Meares, supra note 145, at 398–99. 
150. Posner, supra note 145, at 1783. 
151. Id. at 1785. 
152. Id. at 1791–92; see also Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the 
Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607–09 (2000). 
153. Kahan, supra note 152, at 612–13 (describing the influence of a behavior’s legal status as 
―significant, albeit modest‖). 
154. Id.; see also Nigel Walker & Michael Argyle, Does the Law Affect Moral Judgments?, 
4 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 570, 570 (1963). 
155. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1–31 (1957). 
156. Id. at 6. 
157. Walker & Argyle, supra note 154, at 576–77 (noting the effect of perceived public 
opinion on individuals’ moral appraisal of using obscene language in public).  
158. The classic example is the daycare center that introduced a fine to penalize late parents; 
rather than deterring them, however, it resulted in later parents.  Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A 
Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000). 
159. Depoorter & Vanneste, supra note 145, at 1157–58. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 1157. 
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strengthened by heavy-handed tactics.
162
  Smaller punishments, however, 
caused less of a normative backlash among experienced downloaders.
163
 
Indeed, the results of the file-sharing study are predicted by Dan Kahan’s 
―sticky norms‖ model.164  According to Kahan, if the law condemns a 
punishment ―substantially more than does the typical decisionmaker, the 
decisionmaker’s personal aversion to condemning too severely will dominate 
her inclination to enforce the law.‖165  This principle expands on Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s statement that ―a law which punished conduct which 
would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community would be 
too severe for that community to bear.‖166  And Kahan takes the point one step 
further, arguing that sometimes the more effective laws are those that Kahan 
refers to as ―gentle nudges‖ rather than ―hard shoves.‖167  For example, he 
contrasts American smoking laws with European ones.
168
  The American 
model of ―zoning or segmentation‖ represented a gentle nudge, pushing 
smokers away from non-smokers and nurturing the stigma of smoking.
169
  In 
contrast, Europeans ―contemptuously def[y]‖ the harder public smoking 
bans.
170
 
Whether these decisionmakers are judges, jurors, voters, or small business 
owners, their aversion for excessive enforcement may have any number of ill 
effects.  Jurors, for example, may refuse to convict a defendant, judges may 
impose reduced sentences, or lawmakers may overturn the law entirely.
171
  
Thus, the more effective punishment would be tailored to match the typical 
decisionmaker’s expectations.172 
B. Norm Data 
Although empirical data gauging immigration norms are hard to come by, 
evidence suggests that some groups have developed pro-illegal immigrant 
norms.  From farmers to Catholics to Hispanics, many Americans seem 
reluctant to condemn illegal immigrants or their employers.  That is not to say 
that employer sanctions do not have support, or even that most Americans 
 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 1158. 
164. Id. at 1153; see Kahan, supra note 152, at 607–08. 
165. Kahan, supra note 152, at 608. 
166. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 50 (1909). 
167. Kahan, supra note 152, at 608. 
168. Id. at 626. 
169. Id. at 627 (Zoning or segmentation includes indoor smoking bans or the enforcement of 
smoking and nonsmoking sections.). 
170. Id. at 626. 
171. Id. at 607. 
172. Id. at 608. 
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would resist employer sanctions.  But some would, and perhaps enough to 
present a sticky norms problem that would make heightened enforcement 
efforts counterproductive. 
On one hand, immigration laws do have a modest effect on people’s moral 
appraisal of immigrants.
173
  A nationwide poll in 2007 indicated that forty-six 
percent of Americans believe that legal immigrants have had a positive effect 
on their community, but only twenty-one percent of people said the same of 
illegal immigrants.
174
  Because the only difference between the two questions 
was the legal status of the immigrants, the twenty-five percentage point 
disparity between the responses may reflect a moral appraisal based on 
immigrants’ legal status.  Capturing this moral appraisal is the slogan 
championed by some anti-immigration advocates: ―What part of illegal don’t 
you understand?‖175 
On the other hand, the poll highlights the complexity of the relationship 
between norms and immigration law.  It shows that a minority of Americans 
believes that illegal immigrants have a positive effect on their communities.
176
  
And because norms differ greatly among communities, or peer groups,
177
 one 
would expect this number to be higher in some communities than in others.  
For example, a 2007 survey found that seventy-five percent of Hispanics 
believe that illegal immigrants help the American economy.
178
  Although that 
survey does not precisely track the one above, the enormous disparity between 
results suggests that the condemning power of immigration laws may be 
lower within Hispanic communities. 
Further evidence of pro-immigrant norms may be found in the public 
positions of certain religious organizations.  Some such groups have made 
highly publicized stands with the immigrant community—at times in conflict 
with federal laws.
179
  The Catholic Church, for example, has been said to 
―openly support[] immigrants’ rights activists, and encourage[] parishioners to 
 
173. See L.A. Times/Bloomberg Poll, Nov. 30–Dec. 3, 2007, available at 
http://www.pollingreport.com/immigration.htm. 
174. Id. 
175. See Mark Krikorian, Amnesty, Again, NAT’L REV., Jan. 26, 2004, at 28, 29; see also Julia 
Preston, Employers Fight Tough Measures on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2008, at A1 (citing 
the phrase’s use in Arizona). 
176. L.A. Times/Bloomberg Poll, supra note 173. 
177. See Depoorter & Vanneste, supra note 145, at 1157–58 (showing a significant difference 
between the copyright norms of downloaders and non-downloaders). 
178. PEW HISP. CTR., 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY OF LATINOS: AS ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ISSUE 
HEATS UP, HISPANICS FEEL A CHILL 21 (2007), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/84.pdf [hereinafter HISPANICS FEEL A CHILL]. 
179. See Paulette Chu Miniter, Op-Ed., Is the Catholic Church Pro-Immigrant? You Bet, USA 
TODAY, Aug. 21, 2006, at 11A; Kari Lydersen, Church Is Sanctuary as Deportation Nears, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 17, 2006, at A10. 
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participate in protests against current policies.‖180  After two large Houston-
area worksite raids in 2008, the director of the Catholic Legal Immigration 
Network compared the impact to that of a hurricane.
181
  Similarly, a Methodist 
church in Chicago made national news in 2006 when it provided refuge to an 
immigrant who had been ordered removed.
182
  Some commentators have even 
accused the church of encouraging illegal immigration.
183
  In fact, when Pope 
Benedict XVI came to the United States in April 2008, House Representative 
Tom Tancredo accused him of ―faith-based marketing‖ to Hispanic-
Americans and suggested that the Pope’s motives ―may have less to do with 
spreading the Gospel than they do about recruiting new members of the 
Church.‖184 
Whether the above religious institutions actively shape or more passively 
gauge community norms, their positions suggest that pro-immigrant norms 
exist within certain communities.  Such norms may motivate individuals to 
openly and directly undermine the enforcement of immigration laws by 
providing sanctuary to aliens ordered removed.
185
  But the norms may also 
operate in less direct ways.  Specifically, pro-immigrant norms may translate 
into anti-enforcement norms.  Employers sympathetic to immigrants may be 
more likely to hire them.  Jurors who believe that illegal immigrants benefit 
their communities may be less likely to convict their employers.  Although 
few data exist measuring immigration enforcement norms, there are a few 
signs of anti-enforcement norms. 
According to studies conducted in 2007 and 2008, a substantial portion of 
the population disapproves of worksite raids.
186
  Seventy-five percent of 
Hispanics and forty-two percent of non-Hispanics disapprove of worksite 
raids.
187
  Seventy percent of Hispanics oppose criminal sanctions for 
employers.
188
  Although opposition to such enforcement tactics is higher 
 
180. Rebecca van Uitert, Undocumented Immigrants in the United States: A Discussion of 
Catholic Social Thought and “Mormon Social Thought” Principles, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 277, 
287 (2007). 
181. Stewart M. Powell, Immigration Official Slammed over Crackdowns: ICE Chief Tells 
Conference that Agency Is Enforcing Congress’ Laws, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, July 30, 2008, at A4. 
182. See Lydersen, supra note 179. 
183. Miniter, supra note 179 (citing CNN fixture Lou Dobbs of accusing the church of seeking 
―to add a few folks to those pews‖). 
184. Daniel J. Wakin & Julia Preston, Speaking Up for Immigrants, Pontiff Touches a Flash 
Point, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, at A1. 
185. See Lydersen, supra note 179. 
186. HISPANICS FEEL A CHILL, supra note 178, at 13; PEW HISP. CTR., 2008 NATIONAL 
SURVEY OF LATINOS: HISPANICS SEE THEIR SITUATION IN U.S. DETERIORATING; OPPOSE KEY 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT MEASURES 2 (2008), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/93.pdf [hereinafter HISPANICS OPPOSE KEY MEASURES]. 
187. HISPANICS FEEL A CHILL, supra note 178, at 13. 
188. HISPANICS OPPOSE KEY MEASURES, supra note 186, at 2. 
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among younger, less-educated Hispanics, disapproval is hardly limited to that 
group.
189
 
Recently, there have been small signs of a political backlash against 
worksite raids.  In the summer of 2008, the mayors of Los Angeles, Oakland, 
and Seattle requested that the United States Conference of Mayors approve a 
resolution condemning the immigration raids.
190
  The conference passed a 
resolution that called on ICE to focus entirely upon criminal and national 
security matters until Congress passed a comprehensive immigration reform 
act.
191
  At the very least, the mayors requested that ICE focus its worksite 
enforcement efforts on companies with a ―history or reasonable suspicion of 
engaging in exploitative practices.‖192 
This backlash may even be visible in Washington, particularly in the two 
2008 bills described in Part III.D.  Both the Senate bill expanding immigrant 
rights and the House DHS appropriations bill limit worksite enforcement 
measures to some degree.
193
  These proposals may be the product of an anti-
enforcement backlash.  On the other hand, the Senate counterpart to the DHS 
appropriations bill did not limit the agency’s worksite enforcement efforts.194  
To the contrary, the Senate Appropriations Committee stated that it was 
―pleased‖ with ICE’s recent worksite enforcement efforts and recommended 
that an additional 108 full-time employees be dedicated to such efforts.
195
  
Furthermore, both of the immigration reform bills of 2007 contained 
increased worksite enforcement tools.
196
 
Although a thorough, methodologically sound study would greatly 
enhance understanding of norms and immigration laws, certain tentative 
conclusions may be drawn from the existing data.  For one, anti-enforcement 
norms exist among certain groups of Americans.
197
  Such norms seem to exist 
among Hispanics, and, if so, this creates a significant enforcement problem.  
As of 2007, the Small Business Administration estimates that Hispanics own 
 
189. Id. at 2, 4. 
190. Emily Bazar, Three Mayors Fight Immigration Raids, USA TODAY, June 20, 2008, at 5A. 
191. U.S. Conference of Mayors, Calling for Comprehensive Immigration Reform Which 
Promotes the Reunification of Families, Provides Legal Status with a Path to Earned Citizenship, and 
a Plan for Current and Future Immigrant Workers, Res. (June 20–24, 2008), available at 
http://www.usmayors.org/resolutions/76th_conference/csj_14.asp. 
192. U.S. Conference of Mayors, U.S. Immigration and Customs Worksite Enforcement, Res. 
(June 20–24, 2008), available at http://www.usmayors.org/resolutions/76th_conference/csj_15.asp. 
193. See supra notes 135–41 and accompanying text. 
194. See Robert Byrd, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill 2009, S. REP. No. 
110-396, at 44 (2008). 
195. Id. 
196. See supra notes 119–34 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text. 
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nearly 200,000, or almost four percent, of American employer firms.
198
  But 
such norms likely also exist among the employers of unskilled laborers who 
perceive widespread violation by their peers.
199
  If that is true, heavy-handed 
enforcement tactics may be as counterproductive against the employers of 
illegal aliens as they were against Internet file-sharers. 
There are several possible explanations for anti-enforcement norms.  
Internally, employers may be seeking to avoid cognitive dissonance.
200
  The 
economic incentive that employers have to employ illegal aliens
201
 may lead 
employers to internalize their behavior and adapt their norms accordingly.
202
  
Externally, employers of unskilled laborers perceive widespread violations by 
their peers.
203
  A 2007 New York Times article quoted farmers as ―saying at 
least 70 percent of farmworkers are illegal immigrants.‖204  And the 
perception of widespread violations erodes the norms that underlie the laws 
themselves.
205
 
Among Hispanics, anti-enforcement norms may have an additional 
explanation.  A study shows that a majority of Hispanic-Americans believe 
that the recent immigration debate has made life more difficult for them.
206
  A 
majority of Hispanics worry about the deportation (or removal, as it is now 
called) of themselves, a friend, or family member.
207
  And eighty-three 
percent of Hispanics think discrimination is a problem in the workplace, and 
fifty-eight percent consider it a major problem.
208
 
C. Analysis 
Given the existing anti-enforcement norms, the current employer-
enforcement strategy is not likely to be effective.  The government’s high-
profile raids may encourage an anti-enforcement backlash, especially when 
accompanied by criminal prosecutions of employers and employees alike.  In 
fact, the high-profile raids seem perfectly tailored to amplify anti-enforcement 
 
198. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., MINORITIES IN BUSINESS: A DEMOGRAPHIC REVIEW OF 
MINORITY BUSINESS OWNERSHIP 5 tbl.3 (2007), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/sba_homepage/tools_reports_rs298.pdf. 
199. At least, norm theories would predict that. 
200. See generally FESTINGER, supra note 155. 
201. See Manns, supra note 42, at 945 (―One of the fundamental challenges facing immigration 
enforcement is the fact that employers and undocumented aliens share an interest in subverting 
immigration laws.‖). 
202. See FESTINGER, supra note 155, at 19. 
203. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 38. 
204. Id. 
205. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text. 
206. HISPANICS FEEL A CHILL, supra note 178, at 16. 
207. Id. at 44. 
208. Id. at 31. 
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norms.  By coupling employer enforcement measures with large-scale 
criminal prosecutions and removal of immigrants, the measures arouse the 
anxieties of the Hispanic population.  By bankrupting large employers, the 
measures also jeopardize the economic future of the communities that depend 
on them.  An effective employer-enforcement strategy would minimize anti-
enforcement norms and more closely match communities’ condemnation of 
the behavior.  Such a strategy would require collaboration between the 
legislature and regulators. 
First, the legislature should rewrite employer-sanctioning laws to reduce 
the cost of prosecuting employers.  With lower costs, federal regulators would 
not need to make waves with each investigation.  They could target smaller 
employers and seek smaller penalties, rather than seeking headlines every few 
months with a large raid.  There are several ways that the law could be 
rewritten to reduce investigatory costs.  The simplest legislative rewrite would 
be to reduce the mental state required for the offense.
209
  However, as the 
mental state decreases, the risk of employer discrimination increases.  
Employers fearing strict liability, for example, may not hire any immigrants at 
all.  Recklessness or negligence would probably be a better standard, and for 
that reason, the Senate’s 2007 immigration reform bill was on the right 
track.
210
  Another way of reducing enforcement costs is to provide better tools 
to employers to verify the status of their employees.  With such tools 
available, including anti-fraud identity documents and employment-eligibility 
verification databases, the government could more easily prove employer 
culpability.  Both the House and Senate took steps in this direction with their 
immigration reform proposals.
211
 
Next, with reduced investigative costs, the government could adopt a 
regulatory policy that minimizes anti-enforcement sentiment.  A critical 
aspect of this new policy would be decoupling employer-enforcement raids 
from illegal alien detention and prosecution.  The government would reduce 
the negative impact on the community if it investigated and fined businesses 
without detaining hundreds of employees at the same time.  Another aspect of 
this new policy would be seeking smaller punishments that more accurately 
reflect the condemnation of the community.  In some communities, the mere 
publication of a violation may result in shaming and loss of patronage.  In 
others, administrative fines of a few hundred dollars may be appropriate.  
Finally, the new policy should contain protections for the community like 
 
209. See Tanger, supra note 18, at 60–61 (proposing strict corporate liability). 
210. Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2007, S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 302(a) 
(reducing the standard to recklessness). 
211. See supra notes 123–31 and accompanying text. 
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those contained in the bill proposed by Senator Menendez.
212
  Social services 
should be alerted before a raid, the raids should not be conducted near 
churches, schools, or courts, and primary caregivers should be quickly 
released on parole. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has suggested that norms may be frustrating immigration 
enforcement.  If that is the case, the government’s heavy-handed deterrence 
strategy may be not only ineffective, but also in fact counterproductive.  The 
collision of government policy and social norms may be averted, however, 
without abandoning employer regulation altogether.  Effectively calibrating 
penalties and enforcement strategies will require more studies and discussions 
than the current academic and political debate currently contains. 
Finally, although this Comment has not taken a position on any first-order 
immigration issues, these issues logically affect immigration norms.  A 
complete separation between first- and second-order issues is not realistic.  If, 
for example, employers could hire guest workers to fill their positions, but 
simply refused to pay the administrative fees to do so, a community would 
likely condemn this action more severely than an employer who did not have 
the option of hiring a guest worker.  Thus, second-order immigration reform 
would be most effective if accompanied by first-order reform. 
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